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ABSTRACT 
This study argues that modernist poet Mina Loy's investment in the power of prophetic 
discourse and religious revelation is a crucial feature of her idiosyncratic appropriation of the 
manifesto during the 1910s.  Unlike the manifestoes of the futurist movement that directly 
inform Loy's use of the genre, Loy's manifestoes focus on a visionary expansion of individual 
consciousness rather than a violent and revolutionary overthrow of institutions.  Even as they 
reject the traditions and institutions of the past in typical futurist fashion, Loy's manifestoes 
posit a personal evolution of consciousness and a realization of the divine "Macro-cosmic 
presence" or supra-consciousness as the truer path for escaping the cultural grip of those 
institutions.  For an intensely individual artist like Loy, the prophetic voice also offered a 
speaking position which did not explicitly place her in the ranks of those movements.   
The present work draws on scholarship that examines Loy's relationship to revelatory 
religious discourse and theories of expanded consciousness, as well as the larger body of 
scholarship on Loy's poetry and polemic writings during the 1910s.  As the examination of 
prophetic modalities within the form of specific manifesto texts is a complex undertaking made 
more complex by the facts that (1) the manifesto form is in part a descendant of earlier 
prophetic forms, and (2) both forms are highly variable, recent analyses of both genres are 
brought together to delineate as clearly as possible their rhetoric, structure, and performativity.  
Finally, as Loy's poetic and prosaic uses of the prophetic mode and the language of revelation 
also suggest compelling connections to her nineteenth-century forbears, those connections are 
explored in order to make a secondary case that Loy's work should be considered in the context 
of the tradition of the "poet-prophet," which extends from Old Testament times to nineteenth-
iv 
 
century poet-prophets such as Walt Whitman.  From this perspective, an argument can be 
made that Loy shares more in common with her Romantic precursors than the standard 
narrative of modernism's rejection of the past generally permits. 
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“Modernism is a Prophet Crying in the Wilderness”: Mina Loy, Manifestoes and Prophecy   
                                        
                                                                                “The impartiality of the absolute  
                                  Routs          the polemic” 
—Mina Loy, “Human Cylinders” (1915) 
                                                                      “Our person is a covered entrance to infinity” 
                                                                                                      —Mina Loy, “O Hell” (ca. 1919) 
“prophecy is misunderstood. Many suppose that it 
is limited to mere prediction; that is but the lesser 
portion of prophecy. The greater work is to reveal 
God. Every true religious enthusiast is a prophet.” 
—Walt Whitman, “Slang in 
America” (1885)  
 
1.1 
 
As of 2013, it is safe to say that the textual legacy of Mina Loy (1882-1966), that most 
idiosyncratic, enigmatic and bedeviling of modernist artists, has been well if not fully recovered.  
When Roger Conover published The Last Lunar Baedeker
1
 in 1982, Loy’s work was in real 
danger of becoming inaccessible.  That collection itself quickly became difficult to obtain and 
until the 1990s Mina Loy’s work and her contributions to modernism and the avant-garde 
remained in a state of relative obscurity.  While the past two decades have changed all of 
that—with a wider republication of her poetry, her inclusion in major anthologies of 
modernism, the publication of previously unavailable short stories, essays, and a novel, plus a 
biography and two collections of critical essays—scholarly examinations of Loy’s work still 
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 Hereafter cited as LLB82 
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struggle with the vagaries and contradictions of her oeuvre, and there remains much work to be 
done to fully elucidate Loy’s unique position within modernism, feminism, and the avant-garde. 
Conover highlights the difficulties of assessing Loy’s life and work when, in the introduction to 
the 1996 edition of Lunar Baedeker
2
 he writes about her as a “binarian’s nightmare”: 
  …sometimes to our confusion, [Loy] refused identification with 
  many groups and causes that seemed natural for her to adopt. 
  She affiliated herself, instead, with those considered the “enemy” 
  by the more “ideologically correct” of her generation.  Rather  
  than allowing herself to be fixed by an identity, she interloped,  
  using her various identities to transform the cultures and social 
  milieus she inhabited.  Feminist and Futurist, wife and lover,  
  militant and pacifist, actress and model, Christian Scientist and  
  nurse, she was the binarian’s nightmare.  She was a Futurist 
  Dadaist, Surrealist, feminist, conceptualist, modernist, post- 
  modernist, and none of the above. (LLB96 xiii)   
 
  
While it cannot resolve all of the contradictions enumerated by Conover above, the 
present study argues that Loy’s investment in the power of prophetic discourse and religious 
revelation is a crucial feature of her idiosyncratic appropriation of the manifesto form from the 
futurists during the 1910s.  Unlike the manifestoes of the futurist movement that directly 
inform Loy’s use of the genre, Loy’s manifestoes focus on a visionary expansion of individual 
consciousness rather than a violent and revolutionary overthrow of institutions.  Even as they 
reject the traditions and institutions of the past in typical futurist fashion, Loy’s manifestoes 
posit a personal evolution of consciousness and a realization of the divine “Macro-cosmic 
presence” or supra-consciousness as the truer path for escaping the cultural grip of those 
institutions.  For an intensely individual artist like Loy, who “refused identification” with the 
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various groups and movements she came into contact with, the prophetic voice also offered a 
speaking position which did not explicitly place her in the ranks of those movements.  Her 
“Feminist Manifesto” (1914) is both an attack on feminism “as at present instituted” and the 
foregrounding of what she saw as a new, truer feminism (LLB96 153).  Her manifesto-poem 
“Aphorisms on Futurism” (1914) lauds the renovation of consciousness incited by a futurist 
emphasis on dynamism, compression of time and space, and new artistic forms, but it doesn’t 
announce or call for any collective action against the passatistas of Italy or any other nation.  
Not surprisingly, both of these texts eschew the antagonistic we/they dichotomy set up by the 
typical manifesto.  Furthermore, Loy’s poetry and plays from the same period work to both 
facilitate the kind of revelatory experience espoused in her manifestoes (such as in the poem 
“Parturition”) and also demonstrate her understanding of the precarious performativity of the 
manifesto form (“Lion’s Jaws,” The Sacred Prostitute).  This precarious performativity is partially 
mitigated in her own manifestoes by a pivoting from the desperately urgent voice of the 
revolutionary, whose authority is tenuously constituted via the manifesto’s performance, to a 
voice of vatic authority legitimated by a personal revelation of divine reality.   
Critics who focus on the revolutionary nature of Loy’s feminist and futurist texts 
(DuPlessis, Lusty, Lyon, Pozorski, Quartermain, Twitchell-Waas) typically slight the role that 
religious revelation plays in Loy’s work.  Conversely, critics who have more recently focused on 
Loy’s relationship to revelation, religious mysticism, and ecstatic encounters with divinity (Cook, 
Hobson, Shreiber, Tuma) have generally highlighted the way such discourse operates in her 
unpublished notes, her long poem Anglo-Mongrels and The Rose or in her “Bowery” poetry 
from the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, but they do not explore these religious writings in the context of 
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prophetic discourse specifically, and they do not explore the religious or revelatory dimensions 
of her earlier work.  In fact, this division, between the revolutionary Loy and the religious Loy, 
has become such a critical commonplace that it is now reified as the dominant model for 
describing the trajectory of Loy’s oeuvre. Between roughly 1914 and 1923, Loy’s most prolific 
period in terms of publication, critics write about Loy the satirist and manifesto-penning 
participant in the “sex war” who transitioned from radical futurist to feminist revolutionary.  
The loss of her husband Arthur Cravan and the composition of her long poem Anglo-Mongrels 
and the Rose (1923-1925), critics assert, marks Loy’s turn toward religion and a shift to what 
Maeera Shreiber terms “devotional verse” (468). 
Loy’s interest in revelatory discourse, however, significantly predates her later work of 
the 1930s-1950s.  Loy became interested in Christian Science around the same time she first 
came into contact with the futurists (1913-1914), and by that time, along with Mary Baker 
Eddy’s unique form of Christian idealism, Loy was already thoroughly engaging with Henri 
Bergson’s notions of “vitalism” and “creative evolution” and Robert Assagioli’s theory of 
“psychosynthesis”; all of these theories and doctrines engendered in Loy’s work a recurring 
focus on the ecstatic revelation of a higher realm of consciousness.  In her essay on Gertrude 
Stein, she describes her early years in Florence (1909-1911), noting that “Bergson was in the air, 
and his beads of Time [were] strung on the continuous flux of Being” (LLB82 289).  Tim 
Freeborn (2006), whose work on the mystical strain in Loy’s work and its relationship to satire is 
a central inspiration for this study, explains how these three mystically-inflected brands of 
religion, philosophy, and psychology informed Loy’s own ideas about the nature of spirituality 
and consciousness: 
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  The persistent mystical strain in Loy’s work derives from…three of her 
  mentors address[ing] the need to transcend conventional ways of perceiv- 
ing reality.  Robert Assogioli prescribes exercises to promote breakthroughs 
into the realm of superconsciousness.  Such exercises in “deactualization”  
might include meditating on occult symbols or reading avatars of cosmic 
consciousness such as Walt Whitman.  Similarly, Mary Baker Eddy encourages 
her followers to contemplate instances of Christ’s healing as a revelation of  
of the illusory nature of mechanistic conceptions of reality…Bergson also  
points to dreams, art, and extreme bodily exertion as examples of extra- 
intellectual experience that reveal the fourth dimension of intuition. 
 (Freeborn 6-7) 
 
 While Freeborn’s dissertation examines how these various influences shape Loy’s 
“satirical vision,” which “oscillates[s] between mockery and praise,” the present study diverges 
from his by instead exploring how that “mystical strain” informs Loy’s manifestoes, which are 
among Loy’s few early works that are not satirical in nature, and the prophetic modalities 
thereof (iii).  Two other critics have been instrumental in pioneering the argument that a 
revelatory, mystical strain ought to be considered in assessments of Loy’s work.  Before 
Freeborn, Keith Tuma (1998) and Cook (1998) both discussed religious mysticism in Loy’s work.  
Tuma writes that Anglo-Mongrels and The Rose “must be…read as a ‘religious’ poem” in which 
“all forms of ‘orthodox’ religious doctrine—Jewish and Christian—are renounced by Loy on 
behalf of an experience beyond intellect which she believed to be a direct sensual and intuitive 
apprehension of divinity” (184).  Although Tuma only addresses Loy’s long poem in his 
discussion, he makes a strong case that Loy’s “Christ of the mystic” was an integral concept in 
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her worldview just after Loy’s “sex-war phase” of the 1910s.  Like Tuma, Cook draws on some of 
Loy’s unpublished stories and notes on religion to suggest that “the rhetoric of Christian Science 
may offer insights into her poetry and prose” (460).  Specifically, he points to a short story, 
“Street Sister,” where Loy’s narrator “offers herself as someone who has reached an 
enlightened sense of the boundlessness of the human mind…an ‘infinitarian.’”  He also refers to 
Loy’s “Notes on Religion,” where she argues for a “savage apprehension of the Macro-cosmic 
presence.”  Both Tuma and Cook were among the earliest critics to emphasize the importance 
of revelatory expansions of consciousness  in Loy’s work, and although neither of them apply 
this claim to specific early poetic or prose texts of Loy’s, their observations make room for 
further exploration of Loy’s revelatory discourse in such a direction.  More recently, Parmar, 
Marshall, Armstrong, and Ayers (2010) have continued the examination of Loy’s mystical 
proclivities, though again, none of these investigations take Loy’s manifesto-texts as a site of 
analysis.  In fact, until very recently, most Loy critics have been uneasy about engaging with 
Loy’s idiosyncratic religiosity at all, not only because it draws from such a dizzying array of 
sources,
3
 but also because it resists easy explanation in the context of Loy’s futurist and 
feminist writings as well as in standard narratives about a secularizing modernism in the early 
twentieth century (Armstrong 204).   
Cook’s discussion of Loy and Christian Science reflects on the wariness scholars and 
readers have had about considering Loy’s work in religious terms: “Readers of Mina Loy’s 
poetry eventually confront the vexed question of how a feminist, often radical in her ideology 
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 In addition to Christian Science, vitalism, and pyschosynthesis, Loy’s various notes on religion draw ideas and 
terms from animal magnetism, alchemy, magic, and Eastern mysticisms (Ayers 228). 
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and daringly experimental in her writing, could also have considered Christian Science” (457, 
emphasis added).  Although his brief article goes on to dispute the notion that Christian Science 
and religion more generally are anathema to avant-garde and feminist cultural production, 
Cook’s remark nonetheless captures the dominant view that sees religion as thoroughly 
antithetical to both avant-garde and feminist discourses.  Responding to the prevalence of this 
view among Loy critics, Maeera Shreiber posits that “It may be that many who value Loy’s 
capacity for explosive subversions are also deeply suspicious of, not to mention discomforted 
by, the language of revelation, fearing perhaps the institutions from which such language 
typically emanates” (467).  
While Susan Gilmore follows the standard model for mapping Loy’s oeuvre
4
 and argues 
that religious discourse and a “belief in revelation…come to characterize [Loy’s] work from the 
1940s on” (310), Gilmore’s discussion is noteworthy here because it points out that this belief 
in revelation “surfaces early in her career.”  Gilmore’s comment, which implies that the divide 
in Loy’s oeuvre is not as hard and fast as some critics would insist, creates the critical space 
necessary to investigate the role of both religious and prophetic discourse in Loy’s earlier 
works.  Indeed, one doesn’t have to look long or hard to see the truth in Gilmore’s statement.  
Loy’s first poems, written early in the year 1914 or just before, reveal a preoccupation with 
religious devotion and revelation.  In the early poem “The Prototype,” for example, Loy’s 
speaker compares the sight of a wax baby Jesus to a real baby, insisting that the poor, sickly, 
and broken baby is the one who should be worshipped: 
   In the Duomo at Xmas Eve, midnight, 
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See also DiMarco, Bradley, Shreiber, Armstrong, Dunn. 
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   There is another baby, a horrible little  
   Baby—made of half warm flesh; 
   Flesh that is covered with sores—carried 
   By a half-broken mother. 
 
   And I who am called heretic, 
   And the only follower in Christ’s foot-steps 
   Among this crowd adoring a wax doll 
   —for I alone am worshipping the poor 
   Sore baby—the child of sex igno- 
   Rance & poverty. (LLB96 221)                 
 
None of the signature parataxis or dense irony of Loy’s later poems is present yet, but 
already Loy’s preoccupation with unexpected revelation and with religious subject matter is 
apparent.  Loy is also, in her first poems, already yoking religious concerns to a discourse of 
sexual politics.  Shreiber’s description of Loy’s late devotional verse can just as aptly be used to 
explicate the above poem:  
  This model of aesthetics implies an opposition between the  
  secular as broken and the sacred as whole.  Loy’s poems  
  counter this paradigm, proposing alternatively that holiness 
  is necessarily a broken thing—to be found in the bodies and  
  in the faces of society’s outcasts. (Shreiber 468)  
 
In addition to “The Prototype,” Christian and mystic religious language can also be found 
in several other early poems, such as “Oh Hell,” “The Beneficiant Garland,” and “There is no Life 
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or Death,” (LLB96 71, 221, 3).  Clearly, then, Loy’s interest in the prophetic language of 
revelation is not simply a phase in her later life but rather an enduring theme of her writing.       
 While the topic of Loy and religious revelation has seen the beginnings of a truly fruitful 
critical exploration, Loy’s relationship to historical prophecy and to the prophetic mode of 
writing specifically has not received such attention.  A few prominent critics have figured her as 
a prophetic writer in passing, which is enough to suggest that such a line of examination is 
viable even if it has not yet been undertaken.  In 1987 Loy’s biographer Carolyn Burke claimed 
that, in “Aphorisms on Futurism,” “Loy speaks as a futurist prophet, proclaiming that the social 
and artistic conventions of the past are inadequate to address the complexity of modern life” 
(“Getting Spliced” 106).  Eric Murhphy Selinger refers to “the manifesto-prophet of the 
WRENCH” while discussing Loy’s “Feminist Manifesto” (25).  Danette DiMarco has highlighted 
the late poem “Property of Pigeons” as a site that reveals Loy’s lasting preoccupation with 
religious dimensions of vanishing and appearing (88).  Tyrus Miller briefly mentions the 
prophetic role of the modernist artist more generally while discussing Loy’s novel Insel as a 
künstlerroman, though he does so primarily to discuss how such a conception quickly 
disintegrated in the face of a world war and massive social upheaval (343).  Despite these 
scattered comments figuring Loy as a prophet, no detailed examinations of Loy’s relationship to 
prophecy have been carried out.  We are left with a curious and provocative comment in Loy’s 
last and only recorded interview.  When Paul Blackburn and Robert Vas Dias went to Aspen in 
1965 to interview Mina Loy, age 82, she commented early in the interview that she was 
surprised Blackburn and Vas Dias were interested in her poetry, for her family “were never at 
all interested in my writing” (213).  Mrs. Gertrude Bibbig, Mina Loy’s caretaker at the time, 
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interjects, in German, with a suggestive expression: “It’s always that way.  A prophet is never at 
home in his fatherland” and laughs (213, translation in original).     
In the following sections, this study draws on the aforementioned critical work that 
examines Loy’s relationship to revelatory religious discourse and theories of expanded 
consciousness, as well as the larger body of scholarship on Loy’s poetry and polemic writings 
during the 1910s.  As the examination of prophetic modalities within the form of specific 
manifesto texts is a complex undertaking made more complex by the facts that (1) the 
manifesto form is in part a descendant of earlier prophetic forms, and (2) both forms are highly 
variable, recent analyses of both genres are brought together to delineate as clearly as possible 
their rhetoric, structure, and performativity.  Finally, as Loy’s poetic and prosaic uses of the 
prophetic mode and the language of revelation also suggest compelling connections to her 
nineteenth-century forbears, those connections are explored in order to make a secondary case 
that Loy’s work should be considered in the context of the tradition of the “poet-prophet,” 
which extends from Old Testament times to nineteenth-century poet-prophets such as Walt 
Whitman.  From this perspective, an argument can be made that Loy shares more in common 
with her Romantic precursors than the standard narrative of modernism’s rejection of the past 
generally permits.               
1.2 
Around the time Mina Loy began shifting her creative focus from painting to poetry 
while living in Florence, she encountered the Italian futurists.  The futurists, who between 1909 
and 1914 vaulted the manifesto to the status of avant-garde form par excellence and imported 
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the rhetoric and structure of the manifesto into their poetry and visual arts, had a profound 
impact on Loy.  After writing her first poems in 1912, Loy’s poetry, beginning with her first 
published works in 1914, begins to take on the dense, epigrammatic and confrontational style 
of the manifestoes and “manifesto-art” emanating from the futurist camp (Puchner, Poetry of 
the Revolution 6).
5
  
 Loy herself testifies in several letters to the impact futurism had on her thinking and 
artistic production, but also to her profound ambivalence about some of futurism’s more 
extreme positions, such as advocating “scorn for women” and war as “the world’s only 
hygiene,” a position which she equated with combating “le mal avec le mal” (Marinetti 41; 
Burke, Becoming Modern 157).  In 1914, around the time that her first poems were being 
published in small American journals like Trend, Rogue, and Camera Work, Loy wrote to her 
friend Mabel Dodge Luhan that she was “in the throes of conversion to Futurism” (LLB96 180).  
In a letter to Carl Van Vechten from the same year, Loy credits Filippo Tomasso Marinetti and 
the futurists with having awoken her artistically (188).  Loy called it a “risorgimento”: The 
futurists’ focus on new and daring forms, on velocity, dynamism and a rejection of the past 
reinvigorated Loy’s creative impulses and lifted her out of the torpor she had found herself in 
after leaving the art world of Paris for a sleepy and isolated villa in Florence (Burke, Becoming 
Modern 109-110).   
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 It should be mentioned that Loy also met Gertrude Stein while living in Florence.  Stein’s influence on Loy’s 
poetics can hardly be overstated, as many critics have argued.  Loy’s sparse deployment of punctuation and 
paratactic style owes much to her exposure to Stein’s work as well the futurists’.  For an examination of the 
connection between Stein and Loy see, for example, Carolyn Burke’s “Getting Spliced: Modernism and Sexual 
Difference” (1987).   
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While it is widely acknowledged that Loy’s use of the manifesto form is directly 
attributable to her contact with futurism, discussions about why and how her manifesto-like 
texts differ from the futurists’ reveal less critical consensus, and none of those discussions posit 
a prophetic voice or modality as part of what differentiates them.  One common line of 
argument suggests that a feminist appropriation of the inherently masculinist manifesto form, 
elevated to outright misogyny by the futurists, required a substantially reworked deployment of 
the manifesto (Lyon, Manifestoes 6-7).  Others point to the influence of Gertrude Stein on her 
thinking about poetics and aesthetics (Burke, “Getting Spliced” 98, 107; Quartermain 76).  
Another strain of criticism suggests that Loy’s manifestoes are not in fact so different from their 
futurist forbears, and that Loy imports the very misogynist ideologies she claims to be 
combating along with the structural and rhetorical features of the futurist manifestoes 
(Pozorski 50-51).  In “Gender, Genre, and Second Wave Resistance,” Kimber Charles Pearce 
articulates this same argument in the wider (and later) context of second wave polemics, noting 
the way in which “generic appropriation constrained radical feminists’ rhetoric to the prior 
discourse of the patriarchy to which they were opposed” (307).  While it may be the case that 
Loy’s manifesto texts, particularly “The Feminist Manifesto” (1914), which controversially calls 
for the “unconditional surgical destruction of virginity through-out the female population at 
puberty,” present a problematic feminism that is entangled in the virulent eugenic and 
masculinist discourses of her day, they also indisputably work to critique those discourses.  As 
Natalya Lusty observes in “Sexing the Manifesto: Mina Loy, Feminism, and Futurism” (2009), 
the manifesto’s “unusual mix of maternalist philosophy¸ New Woman ideology, radical sexual 
politics and quasi-eugenic moralism created a highly idiosyncratic position that reveals…a 
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dynamic of resistance and complicity in terms of her relationship with Futurism,” and, one 
might add, with feminism writ large, or what Loy and other contemporaries called “The woman 
question” (256; qtd. In Pozorksi 42 ).  Furthermore, Loy’s adoption of a prophetic stance can be 
figured as part of her strategy for reiterating the manifesto in a way that allowed her to critique 
both mainstream feminism and the futurists from whom she appropriated it.   
Loy’s critiques of both futurism and mainstream suffragist, social purity feminism are 
achieved in part through her insertion and augmentation of certain prophetic structures in the 
manifesto form, most notably through the near-complete erasure of the we/they dichotomy, 
but also through the refusal to performatively enact the break with history that all manifestoes 
strive for.  However it should be noted here that distinguishing between prophetic and 
manifestic features is no clear-cut proposition.  Janet Lyon and Martin Puchner have both 
demonstrated the historical and structural connection between manifestoes and prophecy in 
their extensive work on the manifesto genre (Lyon Manifestoes 13; Puchner Poetry 12-18).  
Since something akin to a vatic voice is already a staple of the manifesto form, one must look 
for ways in which Loy’s manifestoes deploy prophetic rhetoric to a degree that supersedes such 
deployment as is already constitutive of the manifesto genre, or in which Loy’s use of prophetic 
discourse replaces other common features of the manifesto.  Though this presents the 
challenge of a rather difficult analytic process, the proclamations that issue from Loy’s 
manifestic/prophetic texts become more coherent when we examine the ways in which her 
religious thinking modifies her participation in futurist and feminist discourses.  Loy’s belief, for 
example, in an all-encompassing entity or god, a “Macro-cosmic presence” of which all things in 
the universe are a part and which paradoxically inheres in every individual (meaning every 
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person has the potential to search within themselves and experience this “presence”), deeply 
informs her arguments about subjectivity and consciousness in several of her manifesto texts, 
including “Aphorisms on Futurism” and the “Feminist Manifesto.” But before examining those 
texts in-depth, first we ought to briefly address the question of whether or not Loy saw herself 
as occupying a prophetic role.   
  Several essays, letters and recently published notes reveal that, as a modernist artist, 
Loy did in fact see herself as assuming the prophetic role of a marginalized figure mediating a 
direct, revelatory experience.  In her essay on Getrude Stein (1929), Loy writes:  
Modernism is a prophet crying in the wilderness of stabilized  
nature that humanity is wasting its aesthetic time.  For there  
is a considerable extension of time between the visits to the  
picture gallery, the museum, the library.  It asks “what is  
happening to your aesthetic consciousness during the long 
intervals?”… Would not life be lovelier if you were constantly 
overjoyed by the sublimely pure concavity of your wash bowls? 
(LLB82 297) 
 
 
 For Loy, modernist artists like herself have the prophet’s task of mediating a revelation, 
in this case a revelation of a broader landscape for “aesthetic consciousness” than what is 
simply accepted, canonical, or framed art.  Additionally, in the same essay Loy describes 
receiving and reading a manuscript of Stein’s Galeries Lafayette (1911)
6
 as though Stein had 
communicated a divine revelation to her.  Loy writes of the experience thus: “The core of 
‘Being’ was revealed to me with uninterrupted insistence” (289).  Telling biblical allusions also 
abound in the essay, as Stein’s work is compared to sections of Ecclesiastes and the Book of Job 
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 A portion of the specific section of the Stein text to which Loy is responding, as Loy reproduced it in her essay, 
follows: “Each on is one. Each one is being the one each one is being.  Each one is one is being one. Each one is 
being the one that one is being. Each one is being one each one is one” (LLB82 289).   
15 
 
(289, 296).  The allusion in this essay to the unheeded prophet “crying in the wilderness” of 
Mark 3:1-3 resonates tellingly with comments made by Loy in a letter to Mabel Dodge Luhan 
regarding the draft of the “Feminist Manifesto” that Loy sent to her in 1914.  Loy writes that 
she “feel[s] rather hopeless of devotion to the Woman-cause—Slaves will believe that chains 
are protectors” (LLB96 216).  Loy’s comments here are suggestive of an unheeded Markian 
prophet when read alongside the “Feminist Manifesto,” in which she warns women: “all your 
pet illusions must be unmasked—the lies of centuries have got to go—are you prepared for the 
WRENCH—?” (153, emphasis in original).  Loy wants women to “seek within [them]selves” to 
“realize themselves” but worries that her call for a renovated feminine consciousness will be of 
no avail.   
Additionally, in Loy’s more muddled notes about religion, such as the recently published 
“History of Religion and Eros,”
7
 a preoccupation with the concomitants of prophetic revelation 
abound.  “Illumination,” “ecstasy,” and “enlightenment” are keywords in these notes, which 
explore the origins of religion and its “scission” from sex at the hands of Western religious 
tradition (Stories and Essays 238, 240).  In these notes, Loy also gives special attention to what 
she calls the “Asiatic mystic-scientist” (247).  Loy assigns to these most ancient of spiritual 
practitioners a distinction that figures them as the original prophets.  Those who have an 
“illumined” experience, who have experienced directly the “Absolute,” “THE CREATIONAL 
OVERTURE,” or whatever Loy variously calls it (she calls it many things), have foisted upon them 
the responsibility of relaying that revelation to the unenlightened (243, emphasis in original).  
As Loy explains: “it [the ecstatic experience] imposed upon all illuminati an obligation: to impart 
                                                           
7
Exact date of composition unkown 
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to others the formula for its inducement” (243).  From these and other such writings, it 
becomes easier to see how Loy may have felt, as she began to develop an interest in “feminine 
politics” in response to the aggressive misogyny of the futurists, that she had such an 
“obligation”: to share certain of her “revelations”—such as that “there is nothing impure in sex 
except the mental attitude to it”—with women who have not had such realizations, women 
who Loy refers to in her manifesto, a bit disconcertingly, as “incompletely evolved” (LLB96 154).  
Even more than “The Feminist Manifesto,” the more topically futurist manifesto-poem, 
“Aphorisms on Futurism” is comprised of axiomatically presented “truths” more than it is of the 
violent exhortations one might commonly expect in a manifesto.  Furthermore, it is not 
surprising that Loy’s interest in varieties of Christian mysticism should engender an inclination 
toward the prophetic style, for the mystic gives primacy to a direct experience of the divine.  In 
fact, it is possible that Loy saw the truth of the absolute as hamstringing the efficacy of the 
impassioned revolutionary manifesto, as one possible reading of an early poem, “Human 
Cylinders” indicates: “The impartiality of the absolute / Routs     the polemic” (41).  The 
immutable truth of divine reality, Loy’s speaker suggests, trumps, defeats even, mortal recourse 
to a violent reorganization of society.    
 The scholarship that investigates Loy’s religiously inflected works suggests that Loy had 
a certain affinity for revelatory discourse, and the scattered comments referring to Loy’s status 
as a prophet, though not great in number, are equally suggestive.  Before turning to a more in-
depth textual analysis of the way in which Loy utilizes prophetic discourse, I offer below a brief 
discussion of the formal contours of and the relationship between manifestoes and prophecy in 
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order to better situate my reading of a prophetic Loy alongside the more standard reading of a 
feminist/futurist revolutionary Loy.  
1.3 
As Martin Puchner notes in the introduction to his 2002 essay “Manifesto = Theatre,” 
the word “manifesto” derives from the Latin word manifestāre, meaning “to bring into the 
open, to make manifest” and also to “reveal, clarify, or disclose” (449; “manifest” etym.).  From 
its origins, then, the word signifies a textual or oratorical form that is inherently public, that is 
concerned with visibility and revelation in a broad sense.  From the nineteenth century to the 
present, the word has stood more specifically for a declamatory genre of writing that is 
antagonistic and revolutionary, a genre that fashions itself, furthermore, as revolutionary act as 
much as thought.  The revolutionary impulse of the manifesto may pertain to the realm of 
politics, aesthetics, or cultural production more broadly, and indeed the genre underwent a 
shift over the course of the early twentieth century from being a vehicle for primarily political 
ideas to extending its purview into the arts, largely and firstly in 1909, in the hands of Filippo 
Tommaso Marinetti and the Italian futurists, with the publication in Le Figaro of “The Founding 
and Manifesto of Futurism.”  Laura Winkiel captures the manifesto’s polemic and pragmatic 
approach with the phrase “words as weapons”; a manifesto is a verbal barrage “in which the 
absolute certainty of its message contains the threat of violence” (67). 
   A manifesto does not simply address a public, it exhorts one.  Manifestoes are 
fundamentally hortatory documents.  One could say that the manifesto is pragmatic, then, in at 
least a threefold sense:  to compose or declaim a manifesto is to reveal that which is hidden, to 
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perform a revolutionary act, and to make a call for revolutionary action.  Puchner, Winkiel and 
Lyon all see a performativity “of rupture” as one of, if not the, defining feature of the manifesto 
genre.  As Winkiel explains, “more than anything, manifestos are documents of rupture…the 
manifesto’s language of rupture lifts its statements out of historical continuity and the weight 
of tradition, and, as such, the manifesto’s pronouncements become self-generative or 
performative” (67).  This is another way of saying that the manifesto essentially creates, by 
virtue of its performance, the break with history which it announces.   
 According to Puchner, the manifesto’s “morphology includes such features as 
numbered theses; denunciations of the past; an aggressive attitude toward the audience; a 
collective authorship; exaggerated, shrill declarations; varied, often bold, letters; and a mass 
distribution in newspapers, on billboards, and as flyers” (“Manifesto=Theatre” 451).  Lyon also 
catalogues several features of the manifesto, some of which overlap with the morphology 
provided by Puchner, including a “declarative, passionate voice,” the forceful “parataxis of a 
list,” the “refusal of mediated prose or synthesized transition,” the dramatic, 
“millennial…emphasis on now” and the fashioning of a “foreshortened, impassioned, highly 
selective history which chronicles the oppression leading to the present moment of crisis” 
(Manifestoes 14-15, 30 emphasis in original).   
Lyon also identifies a crucial feature of the manifesto when she describes it as the genre 
of “rigid hierarchical binaries” (3).  A manifesto is usually written from the perspective of a 
“we,” posited as an allied author and audience, and speaks out against the transgressions or 
evils of a “they,” variously constructed as “ideological tyrants, bankrupt usurpers, or corrupt 
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fools.”
8
  Even when a manifesto does not actually speak from the first person plural, an 
antagonistic dichotomy is almost always established.  The Communist Manifesto for example, 
written in the third person, still draws a definitive line between bourgeois and proletarian.  The 
result of this binary, according to Lyon, is a “liberatory genre…that narrates” the exclusion or 
exploitation of the “we,” but also at the same time “participates in a reduced understanding of 
heterogeneous social fields, creating audiences through a rhetoric of exclusivity.”  In other 
words, the manifesto’s aggressive and uncompromising stance, combined with an inflexible 
we/they dichotomy, leaves no subjective room between “friend” and “enemy.”  One is either 
bourgeoisie or proletariat, exploiter or exploited; the manifesto recognizes no neutral parties.  
Furthermore, for someone like Mina Loy, whose idiosyncratic metaphysics of an infinitely 
expanding consciousness insists on a “provisional, unfinished self,” the collective ‘we’ erases 
the nuances and distinctions between its multiple ‘I’s, locking them into a stultifying collective 
that might preclude the sort of spiritual evolution Loy deems imperative for a true “social 
regeneration” (LLB96 156).  The prophetic voice, on the other hand, is both fully individuated 
and at the same time subsumed in its role of mediation.
9
  The prophetic voice is in some sense 
distanced from its speaker.  Prophecy, can, however, deal in the same kind of “rigid hierarchical 
binaries,” such as chosen and not chosen, sinful and pure, or repentant and unrepentant, to 
name a few.  The interesting thing is that, as a divine mediator, the prophet may stand 
somewhat outside of these binaries.  In the case of Loy, who hesitated to explicitly affiliate with 
any movement or group, who viewed herself as “somewhat masculine” and whom Marinetti 
                                                           
8
 The manifesto also depends upon a specific notion of the public as constitutive of modern, implicitly male, 
“universal subjects” (Lyon 4).  
9
 As Balfour explains, “in the beginning then, is the repetition of the word…as mediated immediacy or immediate 
mediation…even if the prophet’s words seem originary, it is always already a repetition of the divine one, a 
quotation with or without the quotation marks” (5, 7). 
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viewed as a lone “exceptional woman” who did not possess the debilitating disease of feminine 
“amore,” this lone outsider stance might have seemed quite natural for her (LLB96 179-180).        
Like the manifesto form, prophecy is concerned with revealing or making manifest.  The 
OED defines prophecy as “the action or practice of revealing or expressing the will or thought of 
God or a god; divinely inspired utterance or discourse” (“prophecy” def. 1).  Ian Balfour, in The 
Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy (2002), points to a number of features of prophecy—Hebraic, 
classical, and modern—which highlight its affinity with the manifesto form: like the manifesto 
writer, the prophet is often a public declaimer or “rather like an orator” (6); the future or 
timeless truth which a prophet declaims is often “obscure” and unspecific, much like the future 
heralded in countless manifestoes (1); the prophet, like the “we” of manifestic discourse, is a 
marginalized figure, “crying in the wilderness” (2; Matt. 3:1-3); prophecy often contains a 
hortatory function such as can be found in the book of Jeremiah, where the prophet pleads 
with the people of Judah to turn back from their sinful ways in order to avoid God’s judgment 
(Jer. 3:12-13, 22 7:3); prophecies, like manifestoes, have a tendency to be labeled or 
heightened in power retroactively, based on a text’s correspondence to later events (Balfour 
71, 73). Crucially, Balfour argues, as Lyon does for the manifesto, “the prophetic tends to 
emerge…at times of great social and political turbulence (2).  That these form share a social and 
political context of unrest likely derives from the shared textual heritage of the two forms.  
Puchner points to prophetic texts as one branch of a “pair of lineages within the prehistory of 
the manifesto” (Poetry  12).  The other branch follows the etymological origins of the word 
“manifesto” back to Medieval Europe, where the word denoted “a declaration of the will of a 
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sovereign.  It is a communication, authored by those in authority, by the state, the military, or 
the church, to let their subjects know their sovereign intentions and laws” (11).  
While a revolutionary manifesto writer attempts to reveal a history of oppression and 
an imminent, violent overthrow of the oppressor(s), a prophet attempts to reveal the true 
essence or message of God, Nature, or what Loy in another text calls the “Power Universe” 
(Stories and Essays 241).  Loy’s iterations of the manifesto achieve a unique blending of these 
two roles, a blending that helps to articulate her view that gender inequality, “sex ignorance,” 
and reverence for the “rubbish heap of tradition” are rooted in an inadequate apprehension of 
a divine presence (LLB96 221, 153).  In the “Feminist Manifesto,” Loy exhorts women to “leave 
off looking to men to find out what you are not—seek / within yourselves to find out what you 
are” (154).  While Loy is here engaging in exhortation, a commonplace of prophetic discourse 
and a constitutive feature of revolutionary discourse, this particular exhortation is for women 
to look inward to experience a revelatory expansion of feminine consciousness; it is not the 
exhortation to “destroy” the oppressor that defines the revolutionary manifesto (and which 
does in fact appear elsewhere in Loy’s “Feminist Manifesto”).   
 On a more structural level, Loy also seems to have grasped the problematic tension 
between theatricality and performativity inherent in the manifesto form, as several of her 
poems and plays, such as “Lion’s Jaws” and The Sacred Prostitute, both of which satirize the 
overly theatrical antics of Marinetti, suggest.  These works indicate that Loy understood the 
tentative way in which manifestoes generate an authorizing context for themselves, a process 
which Martin Puchner explicates in his 2002 essay “Manifesto=Theatre” and in more detail in 
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his monograph, Poetry of the Revolution (2007).  By composing manifestoes that are as much 
revelatory as they are revolutionary, Loy is able to speak with an authority that is grounded in a 
personal, ecstatic encounter with the Absolute rather than an authority that tenuously relies on 
a future audience and a future outcome to be secured as a successful speech act. 
Rowan Harris notes that “in all of Loy’s poetic representations of Marinetti, she presents 
him as some kind of performer,” and, one might also note, these representations are almost 
never kind to Marinetti.  The performances are clownish, and they communicate an over-
insistently masculine and violent theatricality that is impossible to take seriously.  More 
tellingly, these satires of Marinetti extend to his declaiming of futurist manifestoes.  The poem 
“Lion’s Jaws” (ca. 1919) and the play The Sacred Prostitute both unmask futurist misogyny as, 
ironically, a peacock-like display for attracting women.   
In “Lion’s Jaws,” a final sabering of the futurists, Loy reveals her awareness and 
discomfort with the way “theatricality and performativity…describe two conflicting tendencies 
that inform…all manifestos” (Puchner, Poetry 5).  In a scathing satirization of her futurist ex-
lovers Marinetti and Giovanni Bapini, Loy depicts the “Manifesto / of the flabbergast movement 
/ hurled by the leader Raminetti” (LLB96 47).  Raminetti is an anagram for Marinetti, one of 
many anagrams that show up in the poem.  Loy herself is anagrammatized in the poem 
variously as “Nima Lyo,” “Anim Yol,” and “Imna Oly” (49).  This is a common tactic of Loy’s, 
which she uses, in the words of her literary executor Roger Conover, to create “demonstrative 
and theatrical first persons,” (LLB96 xiii).  Even while Loy is perhaps being a little theatrical 
herself, her use of the word “flabbergast” in this poem is telling of what she thinks about the 
theatrical posturing of Marinetti and his manifestoes.  The word flabbergast denotes 
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“bombast,” and, as a verb, “to astonish utterly; to confound” (“flabbergast,” n. def.1, v. def.1).  
Even the way Marinetti declaims, or “hurls,” the manifesto is rendered as theatrically 
humorous.  Toward the end of the poem, Loy rechristens futurism as “flabbergastism” and 
turns Marinetti into the movement’s “circus-master / astride a prismatic locomotive” (48).  
Clearly, Loy began to see futurism as a movement whose performative efficacy had run out or 
somehow failed to fully manifest, a movement that found itself left with little more than 
Marinetti’s attention-getting antics as the rest of the avant-garde (and Loy herself) began to 
direct attention away from futurism and toward newer  –isms.  Additionally, the poem critiques 
Marinetti’s “scorn for women” as mere posturing to “wheedle” his “inevitable way / to the 
‘excepted’ woman’s heart” (47).  Futurist masculinism is presented as a ridiculous ploy, one 
that postulates an impossible “agomogenesis” of man and that is hypocritically deployed to 
cavort with women in the sort of amorous fashion which futurist dogma wholeheartedly 
repudiates. 
Written some five years earlier than “Lion’s Jaws,” during the time when Loy composed 
her manifestoes "Aphorisms on Futurism” and “The Feminist Manifesto,” Loy’s one-act play The 
Sacred Prostitute (1914) takes these notions of futurist posturing and hypocrisy to even more 
laughable extremes.  The play features, among other archetypal characters, “Futurism,” “Don 
Juan,” Love,” and “Nature.”  Futurism arrives on the stage early in the play among a crowd of 
men, including “Don Juan,” “Tea Table Man,” “A Man,” and “Idealist.”  Futurism’s arrival is 
characteristically farcical and dramatic in fashion: 
 
  (with a loud report FUTURISM arrives on the scene) 
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FUTURISM  Coward—pouah!   Milksop! Poo-uuu- 
  Aaah! Tango Tout! 
  (TEA TABLE MAN hits him in the eye with a violent potato) 
 
  .     .     .     .     .     .     . 
 
FUTURISM  (martially mopping his eye with a wet handkerchief) I stand  
  Alone on the pinnacle of the passing moment, turning up my 
  Nose at the solar-system, hurling invective at the moon—  
  Chairs at the audience! (calming down a little) Has anybody got 
  An intellect or a dog handy?   (Stories and Essays, 193-194) 
  
  Not only does Loy amusingly parody the language of both Marinetti’s own 
“Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” and his program of parole-in-liberta in this scene, but 
she also depicts “Futurism” as an utter buffoon whose zeal is anything but performatively 
efficacious.  When “Futurism” goes on to announce the arrival of “the FUTURE” with typical 
manifestary bravado, Loy reveals the failed performativity of such an announcement by 
rendering the future which “Futurism” announces as literally invisible: 
 
FUTURISM  (pulling up his cuffs and turning his hands round about for the  
   audience to inspect) You are sure there is nothing there? (catches 
   at the air with a superb gesture and holds it invisible between  
   an eloquent thumb and forefinger) Gentlemen—the FUTURE. 
    
   (The men stare very attentively) 
 
ANOTHER MAN In all its sublime invisibility! 
 
   .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .     . 
 
MEN   A prophet has come among us! 
A MAN   And I mistook him for a conjuring commercial traveller. 
 
PROCURESS  My word—the women ought to see this. (194-196) 
   .     .     .    .     .     .     .     .     .     .   
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The use of the word “prophet” here perhaps hints at the affinity between prophetic and 
manifestic discourses which we have been discussing, both of which are undercut in this scene 
by the hollow nature of Futurism’s declamation and the satiric nature of the responses to it.  As 
with the previous excerpt, all of Futurism’s actions and features are highly overdetermined.  
Futurism “martially” wipes the “violent potato” from his eye, his gestures are “superb” and his 
thumb and forefinger are “eloquent.”  These dramatic representations come across as purely 
theatrical when set against his empty demonstration of “the FUTURE.”   
When “Love” enters onto the scene, Futurism’s theatrics continue unabated, as he 
“declaims Futurist attack on love—most dramatic” (197).  Things get interesting when Love and 
Futurism are left on the stage alone, at which point Futurism drops his pretense of being wholly 
unsentimental, releases Love, whom he has dragged “across the floor by the hair” and begins 
fawning over her: 
  
FUTURISM  (looking carefully around to see if they have all gone—lets go 
   of LOVE’s hair) Excuse me, I hope I didn’t hurt you.  I have to do 
   that for the sake of my reputation.  (LOVE looks shaken but  
   intensely interested. FUTURISM places her with the gentlest 
   care on the divan and kisses the nape of her neck.) Never believe 
   anything a man says about women, when there is another man 
   present! (looking unutterably sentimental)  I suppose you think I 
   am a man made of iron, of absolute self sufficiency—so hard— 
  
LOVE   I don’t think anything of the kind.  
 
FUTURISM  Too hard to want to be loved—while in reality, I have an infinite  
  need of tenderness.  Will you be very tender to me? (197-198) 
       
  Futurism is so wrapped up in his own monologue that he talks right past Love, who 
doesn’t for a second seem to buy his quintessentially futurist “man made of iron” routine.  
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Harris’ comments about the unpublished, unfinished novel Brontolovido, which similarly 
satirizes futurist denunciations of femininity, might just as easily be applied to the above 
passage: “In Loy’s rendition of the Futurist world, aggressively proclaimed sex identities seem 
to literally topple over, with flabbergast male posturing persistently slipping into feminized 
spectacle” (32).  The Sacred Prostitute drives home this point by placing two statements by 
Futurism next to each other to reveal a paradox behind Futurism’s simultaneous rejection of 
intellect and “feminine” amore.  Immediately after Futurism fumes that “women are so 
illogical,” he goes on to argue that “Futurism is diametrically opposed to logic” (Stories and 
Essays 204).  The play continues with a discussion between Don Juan and Futurism, wherein 
Don Juan congratulates Futurism on his new “amorous strategics” of insulting “the sex, to catch 
the demonstrated exception” (205).  Futurism responds that his strategy would be new if it 
were “more than a bluff,” and laments that “I am sacrificing myself to make things new—and 
only succeeding in making them louder” (emphasis in original).  Unsurprisingly, once Futurism 
suspects that other men may be watching again, he resumes his attack on Love, this time in the 
form of a boxing match with heart-shaped gloves (208).  The final lines of Don Juan and Love 
reflect on the bombastic character of Futurism, who has just rushed off the stage.  Don Juan 
tells Love that Futurism is “disappointing—too primitive,” and Love responds by calling 
Futurism “One of the most amusing creatures I’ve met” (214).  Love’s final lines reinforce the 
overall message of the play that Futurism is a theatrical entertainer, not to be taken seriously 
and wholly ineffectual in making “things new.”  Clearly, even as early as 1914, while Loy was 
still feeling invigorated by aspects of futurism’s aesthetic program, she saw the precarious 
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performativity of the futurist message tipping into theatrical posturing, and she took the 
opportunity to skewer the futurists for their reductive views on gender.         
Theatricality may be “the troubling underside of the manifesto’s performativity,” but 
this should not imply that prophetic texts cannot be in many instances similarly performative 
(or even theatrical) (Balfour 2).  Like the manifesto, prophecy often includes a hortatory 
function, but not every prophet is a Jeremiah calling for his people to change their backsliding 
course or else face God’s wrath.  Hortatory rhetoric is not an essential element of prophecy but 
rather a possible element of prophecy.  In fact, prophecy might be said to possess a broader set 
of potential rhetorical or illocutionary functions than the manifesto, as Ian Balfour’s delineation 
of prophetic texts suggests: 
 
 [Prophecy] has the ephemerality of a topical discourse of persuasion 
and, ideally, the timelessness of the most fundamental truths.  This 
tension can be ascribed in part to its mixed discursive mode, both  
performative and constative: the promise, threat, or warning so  
characteristic of Biblical prophecy, is performative and  
“instantaneous,” and the content of those speech-acts is supposedly  
constative or descriptive of a future state of affairs.  (257) 
    
As the mediation of a revelation between God and man through a prophet, whether 
that revelation is prognosticatory or not, prophecy can be thought of as having the potential for 
a more constative inflection than the manifesto, an inflection which allows a writer like Loy to 
avoid “the threat that [a] speech act might turn out to be nothing but stage acts” (Puchner, 
“Manifesto=Theatre” 463).  To put this another way, the signal act of manifestation, a feature 
of manifestoes and prophecies alike, stands at a point of tension between what J.L. Austin 
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called “constative” and “performative” utterances (6-7).  To reveal something is in some sense 
an action and a statement.  If we apply Austin’s true/false test for utterances, which holds that 
a statement is constative if its content can be proven true or false, we could say that 
manifestation verges on the constative in that it is the stating or “making visible” of some fact 
not generated by the statement itself (as opposed to the cases of, say, the performative speech 
acts of naming or wedding or christening) and therefore seems at least theoretically falsifiable 
(3-6).  But, looked at another way, statements, true or false, successfully revealed, constitute a 
successful performative speech act if the illocutionary goal of making what was hidden visible 
had the intended perlocutionary effect.
10
  This stretches Austin’s theory of speech acts rather 
severely, and it is not my intention here to embark down the road of critiquing post-Austinian 
theories of performativity.  What I want to show here is the way in which prophetic writing or 
speech differs from manifesto writing or speech, in that prophecy need not necessarily concern 
itself with actually bringing about the realities it prophesies.  The manifesto, on the other hand, 
is desperately invested in making the revolutionary moment it announces a reality, and the 
possibility of its failure haunts the manifesto. 
Balfour asserts that prophecy as a genre is probably less useful as a tool for literary 
analysis or description than the notion of the “prophetic” as a modality that can inflect any 
number of forms (1).  This is partly the case due to the severely narrow definition of prophecy 
in biblical tradition.  In the strictest Biblical sense, the words “prophet” and “prophecy” refer to 
                                                           
10
 In Austin’s terminology, the “locutionary” aspect of a speech act is the content of the speech act itself (e.g. 
“Gosh, what time is it?”), the “illocutionary” aspect is the action that a speaker hopes to elicit (e.g., that the dinner 
guests will realize its late and go home so you can go to bed), and the “perlocutionary” effect is the response which 
that speech act actually elicits (e.g. dinner guests going home, not going home, or telling you the time) (102, 117-
118).   
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“The prophetic writers of the Old Testament and Hebrew Scriptures; the books containing their 
writings.  In Jewish usage, the Prophets constitute one of the three canonical divisions of the 
Hebrew Scriptures” (“Prophet,” def. 2).  Samuel Meier, in Themes and Transformation in Old 
Testament Prophecy (2009), points to the narrowness of this definition by highlighting 
“prophetic” books in the Bible, such as the Book of Daniel, that are not considered prophecy 
because they do not conform to a strict definition of a prophetic revelation as a direct verbal 
encounter with God (16-17).  On the other hand, David Peterson notes that some Old 
Testament histories of the lives of prophets such as Kings 1 and 2 are canonically considered 
prophecies even though they are merely records of prophets and not the declaimed prophecies 
themselves (3-5).  The limitations of the notion of a genre of prophecy are not confined to the 
problem of strict biblical terminology, either, according to Balfour, who argues that “neither in 
Blake nor in European Romanticism generally…there is hardly such a thing as prophecy in the 
sense of a clearly codified genre” (1).   
The notion of “the prophetic” is certainly more useful for the purposes of this study, as 
it suggests a modality that might “intersect with any number of genres,” including the 
manifesto.  Another reason that the “prophetic” is useful is it allows us to examine in more 
detail one of the traditions from which Loy probably adopted the prophetic mode to 
incorporate into her manifesto texts: the longstanding European and later American conception 
of the “poet as prophet” (Prickett 19).   
In one of the most famous and anthologized treatises on the nature of poetry in English, 
Sir Philip Syndey begins his Defence of Poesy (1580-1581) by pointing to the Latin term for poet: 
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“Among the Romans a poet was called vates, which is as much as a diviner, foreseer, or 
prophet, as by his conjoined words, vaticinium and vaticinari, is manifest” (256). Shelley’s 
Defence of Poetry (1821), following nearly two and half centuries after Sydney’s defense, 
similarly invokes a prophetic function for poetry, claiming that “It is as it were the 
interpretation of a diviner nature through our own” (610).  By the time of Shelley’s Defence, the 
likes of John Milton and especially William Blake had already reinforced profoundly the 
prophetic tradition in English poetry, though Blake had not yet arrived at his resounding 
posthumous acceptance.  Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essay “The Poet” also declares the poet the 
man who “announces that which no man has foretold…[he is] the foremost watchman on the 
peak” (622).  Emerson also called for an American poet who would embody the prophetic 
definition of poetry he laid forth in his essay, a call which Walt Whitman would answer.  
Whitman’s Song of Myself, espousing as it does a revelatory decree of radical embodiment that 
posits sexual appetite and desire as fundamentally wholesome and integral to the human spirit, 
resonates with the kind of radical sexual politics Loy would articulate over fifty years later.  As 
several critics have noted, Loy deeply admired and seems likely to have been influenced by the 
poetry of Whitman in Song of Myself ( Kouidis 27, Januzzi 420 and Selinger 19).  Loy’s 
discussions of the need for a social regeneration regarding attitudes toward sex and human 
flesh share some compelling affinities with Whitman’s proclamations, but before examining 
Loy’s connection to the poetry of Walt Whitman in more depth—now that the contours of 
prophetic and manifesto discourses have been more clearly detailed—let us move on to a 
detailed examination of the prophetic voice in Loy’s manifestic and poetic texts. 
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2.1 
Two of Loy’s manifestoes, “Aphorisms on Futurism” (January 1914) and the “Feminist 
Manifesto” (November 1914), though quite different from one another, can be read to 
demonstrate Loy’s unique blending of revolutionary and prophetic forms and the theories of 
consciousness and divinity that inform it.  Both of these texts adopt some of the rhetorical and 
structural mainstays of the manifesto form—rejections of the past, hortatory rhetoric—while at 
the same time employing the dual discursive mode of prophetic revelation: they present 
supreme truths about reality in both a constative (as statements) and a performative (as 
revelations) sense.  More importantly, they occupy this prophetic stance to a significantly 
greater degree than Marinetti’s manifestoes, which lean decidedly toward a revolutionary 
stance grounded in violent, hyper-masculine theatrics.   
 While spanning only a year in terms of dates of composition, these texts are often read 
as tracing Loy’s interaction with and eventual distancing from Futurist doctrine.  On the surface 
then, reading these texts together runs the risk of reinforcing the common critical conception 
of Loy’s oeuvre as a trajectory from futurism to feminism (1910s) to religious mysticism (1920s 
and beyond).  However, as it has been shown that Loy’s investment in revelatory and ecstatic 
discourse manifests itself in her earliest poems, notes, and in her first published manifesto text 
(and reappears consistently throughout her career), what becomes apparent is that Loy’s 
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engagement with futurism, feminism, and modernism is undergirded by a belief in the socially 
regenerative potential of an ecstatic encounter with the divine.  
  Loy posits that such encounters with the divine, furthermore, are achieved by looking 
within oneself, by plumbing the depths of one’s own consciousness—and that such self-
exploration may be inspired by witnessing or participating in acts of creation.  I side with critics 
such as Cook and Freeborn who argue that Loy’s fascination with futurism resulted primarily 
from the fact that she viewed futurism as part of a continuum of idealisms including 
Bergsonism and Christian Science (452; 6-7).
11
  What such idealism, apparent in both 
“Aphorisms on Futurism” and “The Feminist Manifesto,” suggests is that Loy has always been 
first and foremost concerned with a “thematics of the will,” with that will or consciousness’s 
ability to access an absolute reality or divine essence, and with the potential social benefits of 
such divine contact (Cook 458).  While it may be the case that, as some critics have argued, the 
exhortations in Loy’s  manifesto-texts are to some degree aimed reflexively at Loy herself and 
thus reflect Loy’s internal struggle to reconcile futurism and feminism, such explanations do not 
sufficiently account for the clear concern Loy displays for the larger world around her or for her 
demonstrated belief in the modernist artist-prophet’s “obligation” to conduct and inspire new 
explorations of human consciousness and the divine (Burke, Becoming Modern 160).  Jeffrey 
Twitchell-Waas makes a similar assertion when he argues that, “while no populist, Loy was 
nonetheless committed to modernism as a liberating transformation of consciousness” (113).       
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 While futurism is often discussed as though it were the first star in Loy’s complex constellation of philosophical 
influences, it should be re-emphasized that Loy had already converted to Christian Science and been exposed to 
the works of Henri Bergson and Robert Assagioli before coming into contact with the futurists (Freeborn 6, Burke, 
Becoming Modern 105-142). 
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“Aphorisms on Futurism” (1914) was Mina Loy’s first published piece of writing.  It 
appeared as the central text in the forty-fifth issue of Alfred Stieglitz’s Camera Work, alongside 
parts of a play by Gertrude Stein and art criticism by Mabel Dodge (Burke 169).  Its publication 
marked, in the words of Rowan Harris, Loy’s “first and last open identification with the [futurist] 
movement in print” (24-25).  While it is true that Loy never again explicitly identified with 
futurism after the publication of “Aphorisms,” Loy’s subsequent work continues to reveal a 
debt to futurist notions of dynamism, parole in liberta, and liberation from the past even as 
much of her poetry throughout the remainder of the 1910s scathingly satirizes and critiques 
futurist doctrines of misogyny, militarism, and bombast.  On the other hand, as a putatively 
futurist manifesto, “Aphorisms” differs significantly from the manifestoes of Marinetti and 
other futurists published over the previous five years, in content, in structure, and in tone.  In 
the editorial notes to “Aphorisms on Futurism,” Conover notes that “a printed leaf of the CW 
[Camera Work] at YCAL bears [Loy’s] penciled substitution of the word ‘modern’ for ‘future’ 
and ‘Modernism’ for ‘Futurism’ throughout” (LLB96 215).  While it is likely that, as Conover 
speculates, these changes were made after Loy “abandoned her futurist allegiance” (to the 
extent that she had any), it nonetheless suggests that Loy may have seen her own discourse in 
“Aphorisms” as related to more than constitutive of Futurist ideology and praxis. 
Composed of fifty-one discrete statements each ranging from one to five lines in length, 
the text opens with a startling and succinct couplet—“DIE in the Past / Live in the Future”—and 
continues over the next four segments to expound on the nature of aesthetic production: 
 THE velocity of velocities arrives in starting 
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 IN pressing the material to derive its essence, matter becomes  
deformed. 
 
 AND form hurtling against itself is thrown beyond the synopsis  
 Of vision 
 
 THE straight line and the circle are the parents of design, form 
 The basis of art; there is no limit to their coherent variability. (149) 
 
 
 These aphorisms suggest a modern artist whose ability to “derive” a pure 
“essence” from matter results in a site of revelation.  For a form to be thrown “beyond the 
synopsis of vision” suggests that it reveals something beyond itself as an immediately graspable 
reality, something beyond the senses.  As instructive statements, paired with the opening 
imperative couplet, these lines seem to herald new, abstract artistic forms as indicators of a 
higher reality.  In fact, these lines resonate tellingly with a later poem by Loy, “Brancusi’s 
Golden Bird” (1922), an ekphrastic work which marvels at the “nucleus [or ‘essence’] of flight” 
which Brancusi managed to distill in his sculpture of that name: 
 
  The toy 
  become aesthetic archetype 
  .     .     .     .     .     .     .     . 
  The absolute act 
  of art 
  conformed  
to continent sculpture 
  —bare as the brow of Osiris— 
  this breast of revelation 
  .     .     .     .     .     .     .     . 
  This gong 
  Of polished hyperaesthesia 
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  .     .     .     .     .     .     .     . 
  The immaculate 
  conception 
  of the inaudible bird 
  occurs  
  in gorgeous reticence   .   .   .  (LLB96 79) 
 
       
 To experience Brancusi’s sculpture is literally ecstatic and revelatory: the word 
“hyperaesthesia” communicates precisely the sort of heightened consciousness associated with 
direct and sensual apprehension of the divine.  Not only does Loy explicitly identify Brancusi’s 
sculpture as the site, the “breast” of revelation, the poem’s final words, “gorgeous reticence,” 
imply an inscrutability which evokes the mysterious nature of ecstatic experience.  Additionally, 
in the same year that Loy composed “Aphorisms,” she was also already experimenting in her 
own poetry with language’s ability to convey and inspire similarly ecstatic states of 
“supersensate consciousness” (Lyon “Pregnant Pauses” 387).  In “Parturition,” one of Loy’s 
most daring and original poems, she figures childbirth as a revelatory contact with the “Macro-
cosmic presence,” here figured as the “The was—is—ever—shall—be / Of comsic 
reproductivity” (7).  To see clearly the way in which Loy recreates her experience of childbirth 
as a direct experience of absolute or divine maternity, it is worth quoting the poem at some 
length: 
  I am the centre 
  Of a circle of pain  
  Exceeding its boundaries in every direction 
  .     .     .     .     .     .     . 
 
  To pin-point the nucleus of being 
   
  Locate an irritation  without 
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  It is    within 
      Within 
  It is without 
  The sensitized area 
 
  .     .     .     .     .     . 
 
  A moment  
  Being realization 
  Can 
  Furnish an adequate apology 
  For the objective 
  Agglomeration of activities 
  Of a life. 
  LIFE 
  A leap with nature 
  Into the essence 
  Of unpredicted Maternity 
  Against my thigh 
  Touch of infinitesimal motion 
  Scarcely perceptible 
  Undulation 
  Warmth moisture 
  Stir of incipient life 
  Precipitating into me 
  The contents of the universe (5-6) 
 
 
 Loy goes beyond simply telling or displaying for the reader the physical particulars of her 
ecstatic labor experience; by parataxis and inventive use of the page’s white space, what 
Conover calls using “collage as a texturing device,” Loy attempts a mimetic reproduction of 
revelation itself.
12
  The poem follows the expanding consciousness of the parturient woman as 
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 Conover, following Kouidis (1980), makes the case for “Parturition’s” historical importance for modernist poetry 
and “the literature of modern sexuality” when he designates the poem as “the putative first poem ever written 
about the physical experience of childbirth from the parturient woman’s point of view, and the first poem in 
English to use collage as a texturing device” (LLB96 177). 
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her revelation of “cosmic reproductivity” unfolds.
13
  Later in the poem, a disconnected series of 
images “ris[ing] from the subconscious” suggests a revelation of unity with all the processes of 
life and death: 
  
  Rises from the subconscious 
Impression of a cat 
  With blind kittens 
  Among her legs 
  Same undulating life-stir 
  I am that cat 
 
  Rises from the sub-conscious 
  Impression of small animal carcass 
  Covered with blue-bottles  
  —Epicurean— 
  And through the insects 
  Waves that same undulation of living 
  Death 
  Life 
  I am knowing 
  All about 
        Unfolding 
 
       
The revelatory potential of aesthetic creation which Loy posits in the opening lines of 
“Aphorisms” and elsewhere reflects a very different aesthetic doctrine from that proposed by 
Marinetti and the futurists. In the “Manifesto of Futurist Painters” (February 1910) and 
“Futurist Painting: Technical Manifesto” (April 1910), for example, the destruction of the past 
and the emphasis on speed, dynamism and violence are figured as ends in and of themselves, 
rather than methods for inducing an expanded consciousness, or rather, through that expanded 
consciousness, experiencing a higher or divine reality.  This is perhaps the key distinction 
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 For a related discussion of “Parturition” as an ecstatic poem, see Marshall, “The Ecstasy of Mina Loy,” especially 
p.166-178. 
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between Loy and the futurists’ relative idealisms.  In the “Manifesto of Futurist Painters,” 
Umberto Boccioni and his fellow futurists write in their enumerated “final conclusions” that 
they want “To destroy the cult of the past…To disdain utterly every form of imitation…To exalt 
every form of originality…To render and glorify today’s life” (68).  If one reads all eight of the 
enumerated theses in their entirety, as well as the theses in the “Technical Manifesto,” nothing 
resembling Loy’s concern with the interiority of human consciousness will be found.  Similarly, 
the notion of a reality beyond what is observable in the world is flatly denied.  Burke recounts a 
1914 discussion between Loy and Marinetti wherein these differences in their views come 
bluntly to the fore: 
  She must stop worrying, he told her.  She was neglecting the present 
  for what she called her inner life.  “You are a busy little mystic,” he  
  scolded, pursuing “an enigma that isn’t there.”  The unconscious,  
  the superconscious, and the subliminal self were illusions.  When  
  Mina protested that he took everything at face value, he replied that 
  there was nothing more.  Any other view was a sham.  
(Becoming Modern 164) 
 
             
 As was discussed in the first section of this article, Loy’s poetry, letters, and notes attest 
to the fact that she sincerely believed that there was more to reality than its “face value.”   
The aesthetic and philosophical differences between Loy and the futurists, more than 
just being demonstrable within their respective manifestoes, account for some of the structural 
and rhetorical differences between “Aphorisms” and the various manifestoes of futurism.  Loy’s 
concern with individual human consciousness, and with a collective supraconsciousness of 
which it is a part, must be seen as vital components in her creation of an idiosyncratically 
prophetic iteration of the manifesto form.   
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Loy’s significantly more limited use of the first person plural and her far less exclamatory 
statements, in “Aphorisms” and in her other manifestoes, are two cases in point that reveal 
how different her manifestic discourse is from the futurists’.  Firstly, as revolutionaries, 
Marinetti and his futurist brethren must announce and performatively constitute a clear 
demarcation between futurist friend and passatista enemy if the moment of historical rupture 
announced in the “Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” is to truly come off.  As Lyon discusses, 
the “rigid hierarchical binaries” which are part and parcel of the manifesto form are critical to 
the construction of a moment of rupture with the past.  The futurist “we” in the manifestoes, as 
the professed agent of rupture, must be constructed and validated, must be insisted upon, 
especially when the reality is that the manifesto is the product of individual authorship.  
Additionally, the positing of an oppositional “they” (or “you all”) is equally crucial, as Marinetti 
seems to acknowledge, without a trace of irony, when he states that “It is necessary...for the 
soul to launch the body in flames…against the enemy, the eternal enemy that we would have to 
invent if it didn’t exist” (46).  The formation of the we/they dichotomy is crucial, moreover, to 
the manifesto’s creation of a “highly selective and foreshortened history” which narrates the 
struggle between the two groups.  Without this conflict, there is nothing to spark the break 
with the past which every manifesto seeks to effect (Lyon, Manifestoes 10, 14; Puchner, 
“Manifesto=Theatre” 451).      
In the “Founding Manifesto,” written solely by Marinetti, the word “we” begins eight of 
the eleven theses of the manifesto proper, and only two of the other three are completely 
bereft of first-person pronouns (41-42).  The narrative preface leading up to the manifesto is 
similarly written in the first person plural, as is the portion of the manifesto that comes after 
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the theses.  By contrast, in Loy’s text, out of all fifty-one aphorisms, the subject pronoun “we” is 
used in only one, and the possessive pronoun “our” never occurs.   The speaker of Loy’s 
“Aphorisms” operates largely in the second and third person, deploying sonorous declarative 
statements and comparatively calmer imperatives.  Her tone and stance evoke the booming 
voice of God much more than they evoke the threats of a violent political revolutionary.  This 
brings us to a second major distinction: that Loy’s largely restrained aphorisms stand in stark 
opposition to the feverish and violent exclamations of “The Founding and Manifesto of 
Futurism,” which uses no fewer than forty-six exclamation points in a relatively small amount of 
space.  Loy, on the other hand, uses none.   
 Not surprisingly, aphorism forty-five, where Loy does make use of the pronoun “we” 
(twice), is the most futurist sounding portion of Loy’s whole manifesto: “TO your blushing, we 
shout the obscenities, we scream the blas- / phemies, that you, being weak, whisper alone in 
the dark” (LLB96 152).  As at least one critic has observed, Loy’s manifestoes rarely make use of 
the extremely violent verbs and adjectives which pervade the futurist manifestoes (Perloff 137-
138).  Although, “Aphorisms” does become more polemic and antagonistic towards its end, 
especially in aphorisms forty through forty-six, which accuse the reader who has not embraced 
futurism of “stand[ing] in abject servitude” to “perceptive consciousness” and to the 
“mechanical re-actions of the subconsciousness, / that rubbish heap of race-tradition—“ (LLB96 
152).  Whereas in “Aphorisms” the verbs “scream” and “shout,” sparingly used, constitute some 
of Loy’s most violent diction as far as verbs go, Marinetti’s and other futurist texts swell with 
the sort of violent images and actions that threaten to spill off of the page and into reality.  
With “incendiaries,” “canons,” and “machine guns” the futurists aim to “destroy,” “murder,” 
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“sweep away,” and “renounce” the past and its languorous disciples, the curators, professors, 
and antiquarians of Italy (Marinetti 41-54; Boccioni et al. 62-70).  Loy’s aphorisms, while 
certainly commanding, are overall more encouraging than they are destructive or threatening.  
Take, for instance, Loy’s appeal to “FORGET that you live in houses, that you may live in your- / 
self—” (LLB96 149).  Further into “Aphorisms,” Loy uses the example of a liberated “futurist” 
who can “live a thousand years in one poem,” to implore her audience to reject the past and 
live in a glorious future of possibility that “EXPLODES with light,” that is “limitless,” that allows 
you to “color your ambiente with your preferences” (149-151).  Loy’s “EXPLOSION” is not the 
futurists’ explosion of bombs and guns, but of ecstatic realization of personal potential. 
  In short, “Aphorisms” is more concerned with the prophetic revealing of great 
aesthetic and metaphysical truths for the benefit of its readers
14
 than with announcing, let 
alone enacting, the violent overthrow of extant civilization.  While the “rubbish heap of race-
tradition” and “Humanity as it appears” are subjected to “derision” in “Aphorisms,” their actual 
toppling is deferred into an uncertain future, in a classically prophetic prognosticatory fashion 
(152).  Where Marinetti represents himself and his comrades, in the present tense, in the 
insistent here and now of the manifesto, as the futurist horde who assaults the institutions of 
passatista Italy, who “hurl defiance at the stars,”  Loy’s speaker, in her response to modernity’s 
“crisis in consciousness,” comes across as a largely isolated figure attempting to direct readers 
toward the active expansion of consciousness by illuminating the nature of that consciousness 
(“CONSCIOUSNESS has no climax”)—in anticipation of “man as he shall be,” in the indefinitely 
deferred future (Marinetti 44; LLB96 151, 152, italics added).  As Burke points out about 
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 Even if, as Burke and others have suggested, Loy herself is part of that readership 
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“Aphorisms,” “no punctuation connect[s] the successive aphorisms, which float…in the void of 
the page” (Becoming Modern 169).  Each aphorism’s capitalized first word adds to the text’s 
sonorous tone and texture, and the seemingly more distant and isolated speaking position from 
which they come (with the one exception of aphorism forty-five) evokes a series of prophetic 
proclamations and exhortations more than a revolutionary fusillade.  If Loy’s “Aphorisms on 
Futurism” is her most genuinely futurist work, then its glaring differences from the futurist 
manifestoes from which it draws should signal to us a writer with a radically different 
worldview and aesthetics, even if, as such a writer, Loy is sympathetic to the futurists’ attempts 
to rattle the foundations of Western culture. 
2.2   
In fact, ranked for sheer provocativeness, Loy’s “Feminist Manifesto”—composed some 
eleven months after “Aphorisms,” after Loy had pronounced “futurism is dead” and began 
distancing herself from the movement—is arguably the text in which Loy draws most heavily 
from the futurists’ bag of manifesto-tricks (Arnold 85).  It is also, according to DuPlessis, 
Pozorksi and others, the text where Loy seems to embrace, most unsettlingly, the futurist 
discourse of eugenic and masculinist hygienics (52, 63; 42).  In “The Feminist Manifesto,” Loy 
excoriates the social purity and suffragist arms of the feminist movement for their emphasis on 
political victories for women at the expense of the greater victory of liberating female 
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consciousness from the inhibiting weight of oppressive cultural codes and ideologies.
15
  As 
DuPlessis notes, for Loy the goal of feminism was not “reform of institutions, but reform of 
consciousness” (51).  Still, despite the fact that this text “ring[s] out with revolutionary 
defiance,” a strong prophetic modality inflects even this most incendiary and revolutionary of 
all of Loy’s manifestoes, and does so to a greater degree than any of the principal manifestoes 
of futurism (Gilmore 308).  For Loy continues to eschew the collective “we” of the typical 
manifesto, choosing instead to fire her warning shot at mainstream feminism from the position 
of a castigating prophet who is calling not for women to besiege or protest the institutions of 
the patriarchy, but to shift their focus inward, to search within themselves and face “brave[ly]” 
the “psychological upheaval” necessary for the realization of a renovated feminine 
consciousness (LLB96 153).   
Furthermore, if we examine briefly some of Loy’s own comments about the “Feminist 
Manifesto,”  we can discern once more that Loy was keenly aware of the manifesto form’s 
precarious performativity, what Puchner calls the “theatricality…haunting the manifesto” as its 
“troubling underside” (“Manifesto=Theatre” 463).  The fact that this admittedly over-the-top 
text is the only one which Mina Loy ever chose to actually call a manifesto indicates that she 
was quite cognizant, probably well more than Marinetti, of the pitfalls of penning a 
revolutionary manifesto, especially in cases where the possibility of constituting the manifesto 
as a successful speech act is dim.  Loy never published or declaimed the “Feminist Manifesto,” 
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 Loy seems to have held the now commonplace critical notion that ideology resides within and emanates from 
institutions of the state (a la Althusser).  In the section of Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose entitled “Ova, Among the 
Neighbors,” we read this telling passage: “New Life / when it inserts itself into continuity / is disciplined / by the 
family / reflection / of national construction / to a proportionate posture / in the civilized scheme // deriving / 
definite contours / from tradition // personality / being mostly / a microcosmic / replica / of institutions” (LLB82 
153).   
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which she referred to in a follow-up letter to Mabel Dodge Luhan (the only other person known 
to have seen the text during her lifetime) as “that fragment of feminist tirade I sent you” (LLB96 
216).  Her choice of the word “tirade” here invokes the theatrically incendiary bombast of 
Marinetti’s manifestoes, which Loy was at the time satirizing in her poems and plays.  
Additionally, she told Mabel that “it is easily to be proved fallacious—There is no truth—
anywhere.”  Such a comment, while it might allay the fears of modern readers that Loy actually 
advocated the systematic “surgical destruction of virginity through-out the female population” 
makes this text, like much of Loy’s work, difficult to parse in any definitive way.  One thing that 
becomes apparent about the “Feminist Manifesto,” though, through her letters to Mabel, is 
that Loy selected the violent and authoritarian proposition of enforced female genital 
mutilation for its shock-value as much as anything else.  While Loy no doubt believed that the 
“man made bogey of virtue” was in fact a “principal instrument of [women’s] subjection,” her 
solution for circumventing this instrument of subjection was likely not proposed in earnest 
(154-155).  As her letter to Mabel indicates, she found the idea of the destruction of virginity a 
spectacular and shocking suggestion: “I find the destruction of virginity—so daring don’t you 
think?” (216).  In this text, where Loy is still nevertheless deploying the rhetoric of spiritual 
revelation and heightened consciousness alongside the revolutionary rhetoric of the manifesto, 
she seems to be consciously working within the manifesto genre’s conventions of violent and 
inflammatory hyperbole.               
  With such an awareness of the manifesto’s agonized performativity, and given Loy’s 
mystically religious proclivities, it is no surprise that she would have seen the role of prophet (or 
poet-prophet) as a more authentic subject position than that of the revolutionary.       
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The “Feminist Manifesto” is angry, impatient, and strident in ways that make it 
unmistakably distinct from “Aphorisms on Futurism.”  The sonorous use of the capitalized 
letters in “Aphorisms” is replaced by a jarring and violent use of text sizes, underlines, and 
dashes of various lengths, all of which give the impression of shouting in the streets rather than 
booming from the heavens.  The unique typography of “The Feminist Manifesto” is also more 
reminiscent of Marinetti’s famed parole in liberta, which advocates “free, expressive 
orthography and typography” (“Futurist Theory and Invention” 101).  Obliterating diction such 
as “devastating…upheaval,” “absolute demolition,” and “surgical destruction” seem pulled 
directly from Marinetti’s lexical repertoire and are suggestive of the heroic, “hygienic 
masculinity” Lyon argues became integral to the revolutionary manifesto by the twentieth 
century (Manifestoes 4): 
  Woman must become more responsible for the child than 
  man— 
  Women must destroy in themselves, the desire to be loved— 
  The feeling that it is a personal insult when a man transfers 
  his attentions from her to another woman 
  The desire for comfortable protection instead of an intelligent 
  curiosity & courage in meeting & resisting the pressure of life 
  sex or so called love must be reduced to its initial element, 
  honour, grief, sentimentality, pride & consequently jealousy 
  must be detached from it. (LLB96 156) 
 
 
In addition to “the unimaginably invasive and authoritarian” prescription that women 
should have their virginity surgically destroyed “at puberty,” we see Loy here embracing the 
futurist rejection of amore that associates females and femininity with sentimentality, 
impersonality, and resistance to the new (Pozorski 53; Harris 25).  Harris writes that, for the 
futurists as well for other members of the avant-garde, woman was often “associated with all 
46 
 
things condemned as ‘passatista,’” and, reading this excerpt from Loy’s manifesto, one can only 
conclude that Loy to some degree bought into this notion (25).  In the above passage, Loy 
presents the kinds of feelings commonly “associated with the ideology of femininity as 
downright toxic” (DuPlessis 52).  Lyon cites these and other of the “Feminist Manifesto’s” more 
gynophobic moments as examples of “the obstacles for feminists who arrive at the intersection 
of aesthetic discourse, revolutionary discourse, and feminist polemic” (Manifestoes 6).  While 
Loy “manipulates the manifesto form to challenge parochial, anti-individualist representation of 
‘Woman,’” such as the division of women into either “mistresses” or “mothers,” the manifesto 
form’s “requirement of a political identification with masculinity” results in an unsettling 
diatribe that reveals a “profound antipathy to the demands made by the identity category 
‘woman’ upon the individual” (Lyon, Manifestoes 6-7; Harris 20).
16
              
But despite the unsettlingly futurist-inflected arguments and rhetoric of the “Feminist 
Manifesto,” a key difference between Loy’s manifesto and the mass of futurist manifestoes, 
once again, emerges: even more so than “Aphorisms on Futurism,” the “Feminist Manifesto” 
eschews the sort of revolutionary-movement building engendered by the use of the  first-
person plural subject.  Loy speaks directly to women, but—interestingly—not explicitly as a 
member of that identity category.  Where “Aphorisms” refuses to occupy a first-person plural 
subject position until its climactic final lines, the “Feminist Manifesto” never creates the space 
for the author and audience to belong to the same group and thus to take any sort of collective 
revolutionary action.  The very last sentence of the manifesto does speak of “our generation,” 
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 Harris also discusses Loy in the context of what Emily Apter calls the “feminist gynophobic subject,” about which 
Apter writes: “not unlike her male counterparts, a woman may equally well (though perhaps for significantly 
different reasons and stakes), comprehend femininity as an object of dread” (qtd. In Harris 116).   
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but this statement only places Loy’s speaker in proximity to the audience temporally, not 
categorically.  The “Feminist Manifesto” is in this sense more resonant with the prophetic than 
the revolutionary mode, especially with the role of an Old Testament prophet who speaks to 
people on behalf of God, but is not (usually) part of the intended audience for the message.  
When Isaiah speaks for God and rails against the people of Judah, the “Degenerate 
city…become a harlot,” or when Jeremiah speaks against the backsliding ways of that same 
kingdom, God does not include the prophets who speak for him in his indictments (Isa. 2:21).  
Jeremiah is called by God and promised protection, and when he speaks through Jeremiah the 
words “Return, backsliding Israel,” the implication is that the prophet, the dutiful servant of 
God, is not the object of God’s exhortations (Jer 1:8, 6:12).  Similarly, Loy’s speaker is implicitly 
either a “completely evolved” woman who has already undergone the “devastating 
psychological upheaval” required for her to be able to communicate this revelation of an 
expanded feminine consciousness to the “woman who is…incompletely evolved,” spiritually 
speaking, or, is somehow outside of gendered categories altogether.            
Also like “Aphorisms,” The “Feminist Manifesto” does not speak in the agitated present 
tense of the manifesto form.  We are “on the eve of a devastating psychological upheaval” that 
“will constitute an incalculable and wider social regeneration that it is possible for our 
generation to imagine” (emphasis added). The prophesied upheaval is both deferred 
indefinitely and contingent upon women “leav[ing] off looking to men to find out” what they 
are not, and instead “seek[ing] within” themselves to find out what they are.  As Twitchell-
Waas puts it in his summary of Loy’s manifesto-texts,  “it is as if…[they] are projected sketches 
of what is hoped for” rather than revolutionary actions intent upon bringing those hopes to 
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fruition (114).  Beyond being sketches, though, these manifestoes serve, or potentially serve, 
the purpose of revealing something of the nature of consciousness and reality (and through 
them divinity) to their readers.  It is telling that Conover, in his editorial note to the 1982 
version of “Aphorisms on Futurisms” refers to that text as “51 lessons for liberating the soul” 
(328).  Just as Loy writes in “Aphorisms” that “MAN is a slave only to his own mental lethargy” 
(LLB96 151), Loy comments in her letter to Mabel Dodge that accompanied the “Feminist 
Manifesto” that “Slaves will believe that chains are protectors” (216).  Loy’s goal in composing 
both of these manifestoes is to reveal to the “unevolved” truths about consciousness and 
identity that can precipitate an emancipatory transformation of consciousness. 
Loy’s belief that a more “evolved” attitude about sex can serve as the basis for a wide 
social regeneration and a demolition of the stultifying gender and cultural codes against which 
she protested almost certainly owes something to the prophetic poetry of Walt Whitman.  As 
was briefly alluded to, Loy acknowledged Whitman as an influence in her thinking about sex 
and credited him generally with creating a more “wholesome” attitude about sex in America.  
In a letter to Carl Van Vechten (July 1915), Loy writes: “I believe we’ll get more ‘wholesome sex’ 
in American art—than English after all—though you are considered so suburban—but that is to 
be expected—we haven’t had a Whitman” (qtd. In Kouidis 27).    Kouidis (1980) was the first Loy 
scholar to explicitly connect Loy’s sexual politics to Whitman’s, and since then others such as 
Selinger (1998) and Smedley (2007) have taken up the connection between Loy and Whitman.  
Although there are no other explicit comments about Whitman by Loy on record, the affinities 
between their work are at times remarkable.  Once again, Kouidis was the first to highlight a 
passage in Whitman’s letter to Emerson as particularly resonant with Loy’s own position that 
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“there is nothing impure in sex—except in the mental attitude to it” and that the realization of 
such a fact could induce “social regeneration”: 
That what makes the manhood of a man, that sex, womanhood 
maternity, desires, lusty animations, organs, acts, are unmentionable 
 and to be ashamed of, to be driven to skulk out of literature with  
 whatever belongs to them.  This filthy law has to be repealed—it  
 stands in the way of great reforms.  Of women just as much as men, it  
 is the interest that there should not be infidelism about sex, but  
 perfect faith. (360-361)  
 
 While Loy’s futurist acquaintances also credited Whitman as an inspiration, it was for 
very different reasons than Loy: as a poet who heralded “a word of the modern, the word En-
Masse” and glorified the technological innovations of his country, Whitman stood as one of the 
few “great precursors of futurism,” as Marinetti put it (qtd. in Smedley 140).  Like Whitman, Loy 
resented the whitewashing of sex from culture and its replacement with “‘this tepid wash, this 
diluted deferential love’ in which the body stays unspoken” (qtd. in Selinger 25).  In a recently 
published story called “Gloria Gammage,” Loy’s diction evokes the above Whitman passage 
while discussing the repressed sexual nature of fin-de-siecle women.  The story, a thinly veiled 
roman-a-clef about Mabel Dodge Luhan, whom she once referred to as “the only woman yet 
evolved,” discusses “Gloria’s” unabashed sexuality in comparison to the other women around 
her; the scene culminates in a description of Gloria’s sexual experimentation that is anything 
but “tepid”: 
  She [Gloria] was more organically conscious of the men than most 
  women who are, under their daily ritual of complex sophistication— 
  so rudimentary that they have failed even to get into conscious  
  connection with their own organisms—and function in a tepid pulp 
  —of distantly removed irritations of longings they cannot sensitize 
 
50 
 
   Gloria’s instinct had come to desire to stuff everything into  
  her vulva to see what marvelous creative modification it had  
  undergone in the process—(Stories and Essays 26) 
 
 
 Even for the author of the scandal-inducing Songs to Joannes, Loy’s language here is 
particularly matter-of-fact in its discussion of sexual organs and acts.  More than a simple 
agreement about the necessity for unabashed discussions of sex in literature, though, Loy and 
Whitman share a common view of a “deified self” (Kouidis 26).  The rendering in Song of Myself 
of “Walt Whitman” as “a kosmos” compares tellingly with Loy’s conception of the self as home 
to the eternal and absolute (27).  Another recently published story of Loy’s entitled “Incident” 
highlights aptly the connection: 
 
  so this was life; being a sort of magnet to a sort of universal electricity,  
  while in some deeper stratum of consciousness there lies embedded 
  a familiarity with eternal existence withheld from our everyday 
  consciousness. (Stories and Essays 39)   
 
 
 The difference here, of course, is that Whitman’s “kosmos” seems infinitely more 
accessible to him in Song of Myself than Loy’s “eternal existence” does in the above passage.  
Loy describes as at times inscrutable, at times accessible, the nature of “the Macro-cosmic 
presence” in her various writings on religion.  When she discusses the prophetic role of the 
artist, she often frames the creative act as a means of passing through “the  
covered entrance to infinity” that constitutes the self, as in her “Notes on Metaphysics”: 
“Creative Impetus = the recognition of the individual’s collective identify in God” (qtd. in 
Parmar 72).  Another equation in the “Notes” reveals more clearly that, like Whitman, who 
“absorb[s] all things” to himself for his song, Loy truly saw the entirety of the universe as 
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comprised of one Great Being, which, paradoxically, inheres in every individual constituent 
thereof: “Universe=absolute presence.  All dimension time space contract to hereness of one 
being” (71).  The deification of the self, and the impulse to share as revelation the existence of 
such a deified self in all individuals, constitutes an indelible connection between the prophetic 
discourses of Loy and Whitman.  
Whitman and Loy also shared a faith in the revelatory power of language itself, and 
particularly in the dialectically profuse English language.  Take Whitman’s comment in “Slang in 
America,” published just after Mina Loy was born, about the English language: 
  View’d freely, the English language is the accretion and growth of every 
  dialect, race, and range of time, and is both the free and compacted comp- 
  sition of all.  From this point of view it stands for language in the largest  
  sense. (557) 
 
 And compare it to Loy’s comments from “On Modern Poetry” (1924): 
 
  It was inevitable that renaissance of poetry should proceed out of America 
  where latterly a thousand languages have been born, and each one, for the 
  purposes of communication at least, English—English enriched and variegated 
  with the grammatical structure and voice-inflection of many races…the muse 
of modern literature arose, and her tongue had been loosened in the 
melting pot (LLB96 159) 
 
 Both Whitman and Loy see “a novel [communicative] alloy” in the diversity of modern 
American English.  Relevant for this discussion, in the same essay, Whitman goes on to parse 
the meaning of the word prophet, and his concern with revelation, rather than prognostication, 
as the core of prophecy points to an affinity between his and Loy’s prophetic textual 
production: 
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The Hebrew word which is translated prophesy meant to bubble 
up and pour forth as a fountain. The enthusiast bubbles up with the Spirit 
 of God within him, and it pours forth from him like a fountain. The word  
prophecy is misunderstood. Many suppose that it is limited to mere  
prediction; that is but the lesser portion of prophecy. The greater work is 
 to reveal God. Every true religious enthusiast is a prophet.  (558) 
 
 
 Loy’s use of the prophetic mode helped her to navigate the difficult dialectical space 
between feminist and revolutionary discourse; the rhetoric of revelation presented her with a 
viable subject position from which she could unite her notions of consciousness and divinity 
with her concerns about gender, culture, and aesthetics.  As critical work continues to be done 
on Loy’s relationship to religion and to revelatory discourse, Loy’s deployment of the prophetic 
mode should hold a central place in the discussions of how Loy’s religious beliefs affect her 
orientation towards futurism, feminism and modernism, for it suggests not only an under-
examined alternative way in which female modernists might challenge the more misogynistic 
strains of the avant-garde, but it also points to modernist connections with nineteenth-century 
Romantic discourse that destabilize the smooth narrative of modernism as a clear-cut rejection 
of the past.  Additionally, the conjunction of manifestic and prophetic discourse is itself under-
theorized and needs be broadened in scope to examine more than just the works of Mina Loy, 
for the generic conjunction of manifesto and prophecy also marks a point of contact between 
modernity and its precursors. 
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